Visual Perception: An Orderly Cue for Consciousness
Our subjective experience of the order in which things happens feels secure to us: C follows B follows A. This impression of order is simply that, an impression. A recent study shows that our impressions can sometimes be illusory.
Vincent Walsh
Physicists are lucky, they get to say things like, bring us your initial conditions (a kind of mathematical first born) and our equations will work forwards or backwards in time to show that the ''separation between the past, present and the future is only an illusion''. Everybody nod at the elegance. Along the way, physicists made an important conceptual leap: time and space are really two sides of the same sheet. Psychologists are less lucky, they never sound as cool as Einstein and are only beginning to see the connections between space and time. But the connection, though different of course, is as fundamental to cognition as it is to cosmology. Although space and time, through no more than historical accident, have been studied as separate subjects in psychology, they are inseparable in behaviour. To shake hands, kiss, speak, catch and even to look at something means to get some body part -hands, lips, eyes -to the right place at the right time. In real behaviour there is no such thing as the right place at the wrong time: a kiss becomes a head butt, speech a mumble, a catch becomes an empty clap and what you were moving your eyes towards may no longer be there.
The neural underpinnings of cognitive space-time for action have been set out with many predictions [1, 2] and the correspondence between space-related and time-related behaviours has been seen in several different studies, some of which have shown that our experience of temporal order can be reversed [3] [4] [5] . As they report in this issue of Current Biology, Wu et al. [6] have taken a new approach to the question of temporal perception by using a spatial illusion called motion induced blindness or MIB (see http:// www.michaelbach.de/ot/mot_mib/ for a demonstration -the associated home page really is a service to mankind, and a crushing blow to anyone naïve enough to have confidence in their senses). In MIB, subjects view a simple stimulus made up of rotating + signs. The display contains a circle or a number of circles and from time to time one or more of these disappear from your experience, although physically they remain on the screen.
What Wu et al. [6] did with this illusion (do look at it -it IS an illusion) was deceptively simple. They introduced a flash presented inside the now invisible circle and this flash reinstated the perception of the circle (see their stimuli at http://www.cerco.upstlse.fr/ wrufin/illusoryreversaldemo). The first surprise is this: although the flash caused the subjects to see the circle again the subjects reported the circle as appearing before the flash. The second surprise is that the circle was seen approximately 100 milliseconds before the flash that caused it to be seen. These two things need an explanation.
The first thing to note is that there have been other reports of temporal reversals but the magnitude of the effect is not as large as reported here. So, are we looking at something fundamentally new or something that optimizes conditions for obtaining temporal reversals? Bachmann et al. [4] , for example, reported a 30-50 milliseconds temporal reversal when two spots differing in luminance were presented successively, the dimmer of the two stimuli being reported first. Could it be that Wu et al.'s [6] invisible circle, being suppressed, has a weaker representation than the flash and that Bachmann et al.'s [4] dimmer stimulus also has a weaker representation and that this is a clue to a single explanation? Our sensitivity to stimulus decrements is less than our sensitivity to stimulus increments so perhaps the brain, given a photo finish between a decrement and an increment hypothesis defaults to an increment. This isn't a bad idea but it doesn't answer the question, why is the effect as big as 100 milliseconds?
The explanation given by Wu et al.
[6] runs as follows: the ring is being suppressed but is already represented in the brain, whereas the flash is a new incoming representation and it takes time to establish a new representation. Therefore, the time taken to reload the old representation of the ring into awareness is less than the time required to upload a new representation of the flash into awareness even though the flash serves to reinstate the ring. This is no small claim. To generalize it: you should become aware of stuff that already has some form of representation more quickly than new stuff presented to you. If this is true then one suspects it should generalize to audition, touch and cross modal experiments. It also presents a somewhat northern European bus stop view of access to consciousness taking the form of an orderly queue in the brain, rather than an Italian winner-takes-all bus stop non-queue. It also raises the question of how long a stimulus remains in the queue -500 milliseconds, a second, a minute? And what of other stimuli in different spatial locations?
My instinct at this point is with the Italian way. We always have a weak representation of some previously seen stimuli -this is why priming occurs -so should our temporal order perception always be reversed or at least fragile? Other factors may also be important, such as the importance of the stimuli, the subject's expectations, the history of the two stimuli (does type A usually follow type B, for example?). Do brain representations really queue like the British?
A number of control experiments were necessary. In the first, they showed that the temporal order reversal only occurred during the MIB illusion. When Wu et al. [6] mimicked the conditions of the MIB by making the ring physically disappear there was no temporal reversal. So, the bus queue is only formed when a stimulus is suppressed and not when no longer physically present. In my eyes this means that we can make brain representations form an orderly cue but only under special conditions.
In the next experiment they asked whether the 100 milliseconds advantage for the ring is because perception of the ring is speeded up or the perception of the flash is slowed down. To do this they presented two flashes, one at the site of the suppressed ring and one in a different non-suppressed location in the opposite hemifield and found that there was no temporal delay between the two flashes. From this Wu et al. [6] conclude that the flash is not delayed and it is the suppressed ring that is perceived more quickly. This experiment contains another interesting clue to the explanation -the temporal reversal may only occur in spatially overlapping locations; it is as if the brain can form separate, parallel queues for different locations.
The third control experiment established that in the illusory time reversal you do see the ring as it was, not as it is. Imagine you are presented with a red circle which disappears (the MIB illusion) and while you report that it is not there the computer changes the ring colour to green and then presents you with a flash which now makes you aware of the circle again. The real sequence of events is, then, RED -GREEN -FLASH -GREEN, but subjects report RED -NOTHING -RED -FLASH. Not only do they report the wrong sequence of events, they also report the circle as being in its old colour. This is the equivalent of allowing someone to jump ahead of you in the bus queue because you haven't quite got the right change in your hand. Again the effect is approximately 100 milliseconds.
Wu et al. [6] conclude by suggesting that there is a 100 milliseconds advantage for updating representations from pre-existing unconscious representations. The paper raises many questions. What is the level in the visual system at which these processes operate? The explanation given by the authors necessarily buys into a low level explanation. The MIB phenomenon most likely occurs due to the properties of V1 neurons [7] and the spatial specificity of their first control experiment supports this (it would be nice to know the spatial limits of the effect). It is also clear that visual awareness is dependent on recurrent feedback to V1 [8, 9] and that spatial and temporal mechanisms for estimation of duration and order in vision are consistent with lower level explanations [3, [10] [11] [12] .
For many people consciousness is the holy grail of cognitive neuroscience. These data may be interpreted within some such framework but they can also be seen as simply informative about low level spatial and temporal processing. However, if they are to be seen in the context of consciousness, then I would have to contend that if visual stimuli form an orderly queue, different queues for different destinations and queue according to who actually got there first, then consciousness is clearly a British invention.
